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Abstract
While the performance of face recognition systems has
improved significantly in the last decade, they are proved
to be highly vulnerable to presentation attacks (spoofing).
Most of the research in the field of face presentation attack
detection (PAD), was focused on boosting the performance
of the systems within a single database. Face PAD datasets
are usually captured with RGB cameras, and have very lim-
ited number of both bona-fide samples and presentation at-
tack instruments. Training face PAD systems on such data
leads to poor performance, even in the closed-set scenario,
especially when sophisticated attacks are involved. We ex-
plore two paths to boost the performance of the face PAD
system against challenging attacks. First, by using multi-
channel (RGB, Depth and NIR) data, which is still easily
accessible in a number of mass production devices. Sec-
ond, we develop a novel Autoencoders + MLP based face
PAD algorithm. Moreover, instead of collecting more data
for training of the proposed deep architecture, the domain
adaptation technique is proposed, transferring the knowl-
edge of facial appearance from RGB to multi-channel do-
main. We also demonstrate, that learning the features of
individual facial regions, is more discriminative than the
features learned from an entire face. The proposed system
is tested on a very recent publicly available multi-channel
PAD database with a wide variety of presentation attacks.
1. Introduction
Presentation Attacks Detection (PAD), also known as
anti-spoofing, has gained a significant attention in the bio-
metric society, since high accuracy state-of-the-art face
recognition methods are known to be vulnerable to pre-
sentation attacks [4, 17]. This loophole in the security of
recognition and verification systems is unacceptable in high
security applications, such as border control or law enforce-
ment, dictating the need of having a human-in-the-loop co-
supervising the recognition process. Also, the fabrication
of Presentation Attack Instruments (PAI) is getting more
trivial, due to common availability of dozens of biometric
samples in social networks, and improving fabrication tech-
nologies, such as 3D printers. Thus, the availability of high
accuracy face PAD systems is the missing component in the
wide deployment of face recognition technologies.
Presentation attacks in general are of unknown nature,
meaning that it can be anything as long as it helps the at-
tacker either impersonate or obfuscate the identity. Despite
this fact, a vast majority of the research in face PAD, fo-
cuses on two types of attacks: photo and replay PAI. One
explanation to this phenomena is a domination of publicly
available databases containing just these two types of at-
tacks, for example SiW [14], Replay-Mobile [8], OULU-
NPU [6], MSU MFSD [24], or aggregations of such [18].
Also, the biometric samples in these databases are RGB
only. Recent research [18, 2] states that RGB-based face
PAD systems have relatively low performance in general,
even for fore-mentioned two PAI types, and the situation
is getting worse in the unseen-attacks tests. In our experi-
ments we use a database containing a much wider range of
PAIs, both 2D and 3D, as well as partial attacks, demon-
strating that RGB-based PAD performs poorly even in the
seen-attacks scenario, which coincides with [18, 2]. The
solution boosting the performance of PAD system is to use
multi-channel (MC) based approach, enhancing PAD sys-
tem with specialized imaging sensors. Most of the effort
with specialized sensors for facial biometrics was concen-
trated on face recognition (FR) [22]. However, recently
some authors pointed out the applicability of this idea to
face PAD. A preliminary study using NIR and LWIR and
Depth (D) cameras for face PAD was introduced in [3].
In [3] authors argue that not just simple PAI, e.g. photo
and replay PAI, but also advanced attacks, such as silicon
masks, should be detectable much easier using MC PAD ap-
proach, however they don’t introduce any practical algorith-
mical solution in the paper. In [23] a SWIR-camera based
skin detection methodology is introduced, being potentially
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applicable to face PAD task, assuming that in the attack at-
tempts the large fraction of the face is covered with syn-
thetic materials. The potential challenge for skin-detection
based PAD is partial attacks, covering just a small fraction
of the face potentially important for FR methods, e.g. eye
region. In [20] authors developed a PAD method using
multi-spectral camera, capturing the samples in 7 spectral
bands from 425 to 930 (nm). They proposed an algorithm
based on hand-crafted, LBP and BSIF, features and SVM
classifier, as well as various data fusion strategies at im-
age and score levels. The reported results are promising,
however the PAI types used in the experiments of [20] are
limited to photo attacks only. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first attempt introducing deep-learning
based multi-channel face PAD system efficiently detecting
a wide range of PAIs, such as 2D, 3D, and partial attacks.
The core of the proposed MC face PAD algorithm is
a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), which is decom-
posed into two components: a set of MC encoders ex-
tracted from pre-trained autoencoders (AE), and a Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) combining previous set of en-
coders. A task of the set of MC encoders is feature ex-
traction from multi-channel input data, which in our case
is a stack of gray-scale, NIR, and Depth (BW-NIR-D) fa-
cial images, or a stack of images of facial features, e.g. left-
eye region. Is remarkable, that AE are trained using bona-
fide samples only, learning the appearance of the real face.
Moreover, instead of collecting more data for AE training,
the domain adaptation technique is proposed, transferring
the knowledge of facial appearance from RGB to BW-NIR-
D domain. A task of MLP is classification categorizing
the features of MC encoders as either bona-fide or an at-
tack. Only MLP is trained using samples from both bona-
fide and attack classes. To the best of our knowledge, both
proposed Autoencoder+MLP based PAD algorithm, and do-
main adaptation (transfer learning) approach, are unique
in the field of MC face PAD. Most of the research in the
field of face PAD rely on the binary classifiers, e.g. SVM
or LR, categorizing hand-crafted features, such as LBP or
IQM [21]. In [20] similar strategy is applied to the task
of MC face PAD, also testing different strategies for chan-
nels fusion. Relatively recent trend in face PAD is to use
deep-learning based techniques. In [13] authors are using
transfer learning ideas fine-tuning VGG-Face model [19],
CNN originally designed for face recognition, to the face
spoofing datasets. Then PCA is used reducing the dimen-
sionality of the feature vectors, which are next classified
with SVM. The experiments are done on CASIA-FA [27],
Replay-Attack [7] containing photo and replay PAI only.
Another CNN-based face PAD paper [10] is focusing on ini-
tialization procedure of CNN weights, arguing it improves
the convergence of the training and overall performance of
the system. Authors [10] first train a set of 9 patch-CNNs,
learning features of a different facial regions. Afterwards,
weights of patch-CNNs are substituted into a single CNN,
which is then fine-tuned on the whole face. Again, a set
of PAI in experimental section of [10] is limited to photo
and video attacks. In [15] CNN-RNN model is proposed
estimating two biometric traits from an input RGB video
- depth pattern of the face, and rPPG signal. The results
on SiW [14], and OULU-NPU [6] are promising, however
from problem formulation, one can conclude that partial at-
tacks can be problematic for this approach, since both rPPG
and shape are preserved in this case. The are also attempts
to use autoencoders for face PAD, in [25] authors combine
hand-crafted LBP features and an autoencoder based out-
liers detection algorithm. It aims to detect unknown PAI
better than other methods using hand-crafted features, how-
ever overall performance on OULU-NPU [6] is relatively
low. In [5] authors suggest an interesting methodology on
detecting anomalies in the face, e.g. partial attacks, how-
ever they don’t discuss the application of the algorithm to
the face PAD. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
previous published research using deep-learning based ap-
proaches for MC face PAD, making our paper an initial con-
tribution to this promising direction.
To summarize, the following main contributions are
proposed in our paper. First, a novel deep-learning based
MC face PAD algorithm is introduced, having a CNN-like
structure composed of a set of MC encoders and an MLP.
Second, instead of collecting more training data, the domain
adaptation technique is proposed, transferring the knowl-
edge of facial appearance from RGB to multi-channel do-
main. Domain adaptation is done via autoencoders, which
are first pre-trained on a large publicly available RGB face
database, and are then partially fine-tuned on the set of BW-
NIR-D face images. Third, we demonstrate, that learning
the features of individual facial regions, is more discrimina-
tive than the features learned from an entire face. Proposed
MC face PAD method gives very promising results, signif-
icantly outperforming hand-crafted features based baseline,
on the challenging database, namely WMCA, containing a
wire rage of PAI - 3D, 2D, and partial attacks. Finally, the
results reported in this work are fully reproducible: experi-
mental database is publicly available, the evaluation proto-
cols are strictly defined, and the source code for replicating
experiments is published∗.
2. Proposed multi-channel face PAD approach
This section briefly introduces the proposed multi-
channel face PAD system. The PAD algorithms is CNN
based, where special CNN structure is used to categorize
input MC data into bona-fide or attack classes, see Figure 1.
∗Source code: https://gitlab.idiap.ch/bob/bob.
paper.mcae.icb2019
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the proposed MC face PAD approach: visualizing the preprocessing stage, internal structure of
convolutional autoencoders, training and domain adaptation (fine-tuning) strategy, and the structure of the final CNN-based PAD system.
The Conv/DeConv layers are parametrized as follows: number of input channels × number of output channels × size of the filter kernel.
While the network architecture can be represented as CNN,
the proposed training technique, allowing domain adapta-
tion, is unique, and is discussed later. An input MC data for
the CNN is a set of stacked BW-NIR-D images correspond-
ing to different facial regions, e.g. left-eye, see Figure 1.
According to the widely accepted taxonomy [11], this type
of biometric information integration from multiple cameras
is called sensor level fusion. Sensor level fusion preserves
maximum variance in the fused data, allowing the network
to assess the hidden dependencies in the lowest level. How-
ever, this type of fusion requires special data preprocessing,
making the streams to be blended compatible.
# Input stream Preprocessing
1. RGB Face, and landmarks detection in all frames.
2. RGB Conversion of all frames to BW format.
3. NIR, D Registration / alignment to BW channel.
4. NIR, D Normalization of dynamic range to [0, 255].
5. NIR, D Data type-casting to 8-bit format.
6. BW, NIR, D Scaling, rotation, and cropping of facial regions.
7. BW, NIR, D Stacking of facial images into BW-NIR-D image.
Table 1. Preprocessing steps to generate BW-NIR-D facial images.
Preprocessing applied to all frames of input RGB, NIR,
and D videos, allowing to generate BW-NIR-D facial im-
ages, is summarized in Table 1. An example of the pre-
processing product is displayed in Figure 1, denoted as MC
face, and RGB face. To generate RGB facial images, only
steps 1 and 6 are applied to the input RGB stream. The
face and landmark detection method is using MTCNN [26]
deep neural network. The proposed dynamic range normal-
ization technique of the NIR, and D streams is based on
Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) measure. To clarify the
MAD-based normalization, let I be a non-RGB image of the
facial region. Given I, a vector v containing non-zero ele-
ments of I is obtained. Next, a MAD measure is computed
as follows:
MAD = median(|v −median(v)|) (1)
Given the MAD value, the input image I is normalized:
Iˆi,j =
(Ii,j −median(v) + σ ·MAD)
2 · σ ·MAD · (2
8 − 1), (2)
where Iˆ is normalized image, i = 1, . . . ,W ; j = 1, . . . ,H ,
and W , H are the width and height of I. In our experiment:
σNIR = 3, σD = 6. The size of the facial images is nor-
malized to 128 × 128 pixels, and the images are rotated so
that the eye-line is horizontal. Given preprocessed training
data the subsequent step is CNN training.
# Train step Training data DB, classes used
1. Train N AEs RGB face regions CelebA [16], BF
2. Fine-tune N AEs MC face regions WMCA, BF
3. Train an MLP MC latent encodings WMCA, BF&PA
Table 2. Steps to train a CNN-based MC face PAD system. BF
and PA stands for samples from bona-fide and presentation attack
classes.
Training of the proposed CNN based multi-channel face
PAD system is using both RGB and MC facial data, and is
summarized in Table 2. An entire CNN is never trained,
instead training steps are associated to two internal CNN
components: a set of convolutional autoencoders, and an
MLP, see Figure 1. First, a set of N convolutional autoen-
coders, reconstructing RGB facial regions, is pre-trained.
Pre-training is done using images from publicly available
database, namely CelebA [16], having significantly higher
number of bona-fide samples and identities, than any PAD-
specific database to date. AE pre-training helps to better
position the network in the search space. The subsequent
step is fine-tuning of AEs using MC face regions, extracted
Glasses Print Replay Fake head
Rigid masks Flexible mask Paper mask
PAI samplesBona-fide samples
6 different sessions
Figure 2. Examples of bona-fide data in 6 different sessions, and
presentation attacks corresponding to 7 different categories.
from train set of WMCA. It is worth mentioning, that the di-
mensionality of RGB and MC training samples is identical.
Here we propose to fine-tune just the first layers of encoders
(partial fine-tuning), and last 2 layers of decoders (for sym-
metry), instead of fine-tuning the entire autoencoders. The
intuition behind this proposition, is that only low level fea-
tures are domain dependent, while deeper features are do-
main independent mostly preserving structural information
of the face. In the experimental section we prove empir-
ically, that proposed RGB-to-MC domain adaptation via
partial fine-tuning is more efficient than full fine-tuning.
The effectiveness of similar domain adaptation strategy has
also been addressed in [9], focusing on the task of hetero-
geneous face recognition. Both pre-training and fine-tuning
of AEs is using bona-fide samples only, and is taking 50
epochs each. The latent vectors of trained encoders are
used as input features for the MLP, see Figure 1. An MLP
is trained using latent features of both bona-fide and attack
classes present in the training set of the WMCA database,
Table 2. The best performing MLP model is selected cross-
validating them on the development set of WMCA. Sum-
marizing, the composition of trained convolutional autoen-
coders, and MLP, is forming the proposed MC face PAD
system.
3. Experimental Database
The introduced face PAD system is evaluated on
the Wide Multi-Channel presentation Attack (WMCA)
database (DB), containing a total of 1679 video files of
bona-fide and presentation attacks corresponding to 72
identities. The temporally synchronized video streams
are recorded with two consumer capturing devices, Intel R©
RealSenseTMSR300 capturing RGB-NIR-D streams, and
Seek Thermal CompactPRO recording the thermal (T)
stream. The data collection was split into seven sessions
over an interval of five months. Bona-fide samples were
recorded in 6 sessions. In each session, a bona-fide and at
least two PA performed by the participant were captured.
The WMCA DB has more than eighty different presenta-
tion attack instruments, which can be groped into seven cat-
egories: glasses, fake head, print, replay, rigid mask, flex-
ible/silicon mask, and paper mask. Examples correspond-
ing to these PA categories, as well as the case of bona-fide
data for 6 different sessions, are shown in Figure 2. More
detailed information on the number of files for each PA cat-
egory, and video data technicalities, are summarized in Ta-
ble 3. Please refer to [12] for more details on the WMCA
database.
Type #Videos Video Details
bona-fide 347 (72 IDs) Length:
10 seconds
————————
#Frames:
RGB-NIR-D: 300
T: 150
————————
Format:
Uncompressed
glasses 75
fake head 122
print 200
replay 348
rigid mask 137
flexible mask 379
paper mask 71
Total 1679 (5.1 TB)
Table 3. Main statistics of the WMCA DB.
4. Experimental evaluation
This section covers the details on the evaluation pro-
tocols for the WMCA DB, following by the experimen-
tal results for baseline MC PAD algorithm, and the re-
sults for the proposed PAD setup with different settings.
In all experiments, only RGB-NIR-D channels available
in WMCA are used, making the proposed PAD system de-
pendent on one capturing device only, specifically Intel R©
RealSenseTMSR300.
The WMCA evaluation protocol, namely grandtest-
10, follows the legacy evaluation strategy, in this protocol
samples of all PAI categories, and bona-fide, are evenly dis-
tributed across all subsets: training, development, and eval-
uation. The identities of bona-fide samples are not inter-
secting across these subsets. The number 10, in the proto-
col name, stands for the number of frames uniformly sam-
pled from each video, thus the total number of biometric
samples, using frame-level evaluation strategy, is 1679 · 10.
Training set is used for training the PAD system. The
threshold corresponding to the selected operation points is
chosen on the development set, and the system performance
is reported on the evaluation set given the threshold.
The evaluation metrics is adopted from the ISO/IEC
30107-3 standard [1], APCER (Attack Presentation Clas-
sification Error Rate), and BPCER (Bona-fide Presentation
Classification Error Rate). We also adopt two measures,
namely BPCER20, and BPCER100, which are the BPCER
at APCER 5.0%, and 1.0%, respectively. Again, the thresh-
olds corresponding to BPCER20, and BPCER100, are se-
lected on the development set, then BPCER, and APCER
Channel RGB NIR D Fused
Method IQM+LR LBP+LR LBP+LR LR
BPCER20 77.7 9.9 13.8 3.0
APCER 13.2 7.1 9.6 10.4
BPCER100 94.6 35.6 57.5 14.1
APCER 8.5 1.9 2.0 2.9
Table 4. Baseline results for evaluation set of WMCA, grandtest-
10 protocol. Thresholds are computed on development set.
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Figure 3. DET curves for baselines. For the evaluation set of
WMCA, grandtest-10 protocol.
values are reported on the evaluation set given threshold.
In addition to numerical performance, the DET curves are
given for all experiments.
4.1. Results: MC face PAD baselines
In this subsection a baseline RGB-NIR-D face PAD sys-
tem is discussed and evaluated, being composed of success-
ful, channel specific, hand-crafted features combined with
two-class classifiers. The baseline PAD system is composed
of 4 blocks: preprocessing, feature extraction, classifica-
tion, and fusion. The preprocessing stage is similar to the
one introduced in Section 2, excluding sensor level fusion.
In the baseline setup each channel is handled individually,
and preprocessed data examples are displayed in Figure 1,
denoted as RGB, NIR, and D face. The cropped faces are
normalized to 64 × 64 pixels, and the frames with faces
smaller than 50× 50 are discarded.
In the feature extraction stage, a grid search across
popular hand-crafted features was adopted to identify the
best performing ones. The considered features demon-
strating reasonable performance in recent literature are Im-
age Quality Measures (IQM) [18], and LBP/MCT his-
tograms [18, 25]. An IQM is used for the RGB channel,
producing feature vectors of 139 quality measures. As a
result of a grid-search in the parameter space of spatially
enhanced LBP/MCT histograms, an MCT8,1 (8 sampling
points on a radius of 1) features are chosen for NIR data,
and LBP8,1 spatially enhanced histograms computed over
2× 2 regions are selected for D frames.
Method Single AE for entire MC face + MLP
AE training CelebA
CelebA+WMCA
all encoder layers
CelebA+WMCA
1 encoder layer
BPCER20 3.0 1.9 4.1
APCER 4.7 4.5 2.8
BPCER100 59.0 51.7 51.6
APCER 0.0 0.3 0.0
Method 9 AE using MC face blocks + MLP
AE training CelebA
CelebA+WMCA
all encoder layers
CelebA+WMCA
1 encoder layer
BPCER20 1.1 5.0 1.5
APCER 5.9 3.8 3.1
BPCER100 11.9 12.3 7.3
APCER 1.1 0.7 0.8
Method 16 AE using MC face blocks + MLP
AE training CelebA
CelebA+WMCA
all encoder layers
CelebA+WMCA
1 encoder layer
BPCER20 1.7 3.0 1.0
APCER 3.1 3.6 3.5
BPCER100 10.7 16.4 20.4
APCER 0.7 0.6 0.2
Table 5. BPCER20, BPCER100, and corresponding APCER in%,
for the proposed MC face PAD system, reported for evaluation
set of WMCA, grandtest-10 protocol. Experiments for different
regioning of facial images, and different AE training strategies.
Thresholds are computed on development set.
The classification stage deploys a Logistic Regression
(LR) for all channels. The features are normalized to zero-
mean and unity standard deviation before the training, and
the normalization parameters are computed using samples
of bona-fide class only. In the prediction stage, a probabil-
ity of a sample being a PA is computed given pre-trained
LR model. A fusion of individual RGB-NIR-D channels is
done in the score-level using the same LR-based approach.
An LR for the fusion stage is trained using channel scores
computed on the development set of WMCA.
The results for this sequence of experiments are intro-
duced in Table 4, accumulating BPCER20, BPCER100
and corresponding APCER values on the evaluation set of
WMCA. Additionally, DET curves are given in Figure 3.
Both from table and DET, one can observe, that MC ap-
proach boosts the performance, and legacy RGB baseline
operates poorly on the WMCA DB containing a wide range
of challenging PAIs.
4.2. Results: proposed MC face PAD algorithm
In this subsection a proposed CNN-based BW-NIR-D
face PAD system is evaluated under different training sce-
narios and parametrization. Training of the network in-
corporates both RGB data from CelebA, and BW-NIR-D
data from WMCA databases. To be suitable for train-
ing the biometric recordings are first preprocessed, as dis-
cussed in Section 2, producing facial images of the size
128(pixels)× 128(pixels)× 3(chanels) in both RGB and MC
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Figure 4. DET curves for PAD system using AE for the entire
MC face, and MLP classifier. For the evaluation set of WMCA,
grandtest-10 protocol.
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Figure 5. DET curves for PAD system using 9 AE for MC fa-
cial blocks, and MLP classifier. For the evaluation set of WMCA,
grandtest-10 protocol.
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Figure 6. DET curves for PAD system using 16 AE for MC fa-
cial blocks, and MLP classifier. For the evaluation set of WMCA,
grandtest-10 protocol.
cases. The preprocessed RGB data from CelebA database
undergoes additional quality assessment procedure, before
being used for training. More specifically, an eye detec-
tion algorithm is applied to face images, assuring the de-
viation of eye coordinates from expected positions is not
significant. The Haar-based eye detector from OpenCV is
integrated for this purpose. This is done to exclude im-
ages with occlusions, e.g. sun-glasses, which can be consid-
ered as PAI, rather than bona-fide. The resulting amount of
bona-fide RGB and MC training images is 42499, and 1240
respectively. An example of preprocessed/training data is
displayed in Figure 1, denoted as RGB face and MC face.
Three training strategies are explored in current ex-
periments: N autoencoders (AEs) are trained using only
RGB CelebA facial regions (no domain adaptation); N
AEs are trained using RGB CelebA facial regions, and fully
fine-tuned using MC facial regions (RGB-to-MC domain
adaptation, full fine-tuning); N AEs are trained using RGB
CelebA facial regions, and only first and 2 last layers are
fine-tuned using MC facial regions (RGB-to-MC domain
adaptation, partial fine-tuning). As discussed in Section 2,
training of the proposed network is associated to two com-
ponents: a set of convolutional AEs, and an MLP. Here,
training of an MLP remains the same, for all three strategies
of autoencoders training. An MLP is trained using latent
features (concatenation of latent vectors of all AEs) of both
bona-fide and attack classes present in the training set of the
WMCA database. In each experiment, an MLP is re-trained
10 times, initializing it differently. The best MLP model
is selected cross-validating them on the development set of
the WMCA. A BCE loss is used in both training and cross-
validation of an MLP. AEs are trained with MSE loss in
the unsupervised manner, running training and fine-tuning
for 50 epoch each. The detailed parametrization of autoen-
coders and MLP is displayed in Figure 1.
Additionally, three face regioning approaches are ob-
served for each training strategy discussed above. In the
first sequence of experiments, an autoencoder is trained
using entire face region, N = 1. Second and third ap-
proaches assume splitting of the facial region into N = 9,
and N = 16 regions respectively, training an individual
AE for each region. The dimensionality of RGB/MC fa-
cial blocks is 64(pixels)×64(pixels)×3(chanels) for N = 9,
and is 32(pixels) × 32(pixels) × 3(chanels) for N = 16, with
a patching stride of 32 pixels in both cases. The dimension-
alities of latent feature spaces are 1296 for N = 1, 3600 for
N = 9, and 2304 for N = 16.
The results for this sequence of experiments are in-
troduced in Table 5, summarizing BPCER20, BPCER100
and corresponding APCER values on the evaluation set of
WMCA. The DET curves are given in Figure 4 for N = 1,
Figure 5 forN = 9, and Figure 6 forN = 16. From Table 5
one can see, that top BPCER20 and BPCER100 values are
observed in the case of AEs training incorporating partial
fine-tuning, and with face regioning. The same trend can
be observed in the DET curves, with clearly best perform-
ing PAD system based on N = 9 autoencoders, which are
pre-trained using RGB CelebA facial regions, followed by
partial fine-tuning on MC data from WMCA, see Figure 5.
Also, latent features learned combining bona-fide training
Channel RGB
Method IQM+LR
9 AE trained on
CelebA + MLP
BPCER20 77.7 10.5
APCER 13.2 17.3
BPCER100 94.6 29.2
APCER 8.5 7.8
Table 6. BPCER20, BPCER100, and corresponding APCER in%,
using RGB channel only for evaluation set of WMCA, grandtest-
10 protocol. Thresholds are computed on development set.
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Figure 7. DET curves for proposed RGB PAD system (using 9 AE
for RGB facial blocks, and MLP classifier) and RGB baseline, vs.
proposed MC PAD approach and MC baseline. For the evaluation
set of WMCA, grandtest-10 protocol.
samples from RGB and MC domains, demonstrate the su-
perior discriminative capacity, as opposed to the MC base-
lines using hand-crafted features, especially in the range of
low APCER values, Figure 5.
Interestingly, that full AEs fine-tuning using MC data
doesn’t boost, or even degrades, the overall performance of
the PAD system in all face regioning approaches, Figures 4
- 6. While the proposed partial fine-tuning has a stable pos-
itive impact, as opposed to the AEs trained using CelebA
data only. It is worth mentioning, that we have also tested
other RGB-to-MC domain adaptation strategies, fine-tuning
more than just one layer of encoders, but it doesn’t improve
the performance further.
4.3. Results: proposed face PAD in RGB mode
In the final sequence of experiments, the introduced face
PAD approach is tested in RGB mode, meaning that AEs
are trained using RGB CelebA facial regions only, and an
MLP is trained using latent encodings obtained from RGB
channel of WMCA. No fine-tuning of AEs is involved. The
input data in the experiments is RGB channel, present in
the WMCA DB. Other parameters of the system, e.g. pre-
processing and face regioning (N = 9), are the same as
in the best performing system of subsection 4.2. Follow-
ing the results summarized in Table 6 and Figure 7, offered
RGB CNN-based system outperforms the IQM-based RGB
baseline by a large margin. However, an auxiliary discrim-
inative information introduced by MC approach seems to
have a higher impact on the performance, rather than using
advanced PAD methods in RGB domain only, see Figure 7.
5. Conclusion
Current paper suggests a multi-channel face anti-
spoofing solution, being motivated by the need of high se-
curity PAD systems, capable of dealing with challenging
attacks, such as 3D and partial PAIs. The introduced ap-
proach is using a consumer grade imaging sensors, cap-
turing BW-NIR-D streams, in combination with a deep-
learning based PAD algorithm. In the experimental section
we demonstrate, that heavily studied RGB-based legacy
systems are inefficient in detecting a wide range of chal-
lenging PAIs present in the WMCA database. In contrast,
our proposed solution gives very promising results, espe-
cially in the range of low APCER values, which is critical
for high security applications, see Figure 7.
Current paper introduces a number of novelties. First,
a CNN-based MC face PAD algorithm, which is decom-
posed into a set of encoders, processing individual MC fa-
cial regions, and an MLP, categorizing latent encodings into
real or attacks classes. Second, CNN decomposition allows
us to introduce a special training procedure, transferring
the knowledge of facial appearance from RGB to multi-
channel domain. Domain adaptation is done via autoen-
coders, which are first pre-trained on a large set of RGB
facial data from CelebA, and are then partially fine-tuned
on the BW-NIR-D data from WMCA DB. Here partial fine-
tuning means training of the first layers of encoders, and last
2 layers of decoders (for symmetry). The intuition behind
this proposition, is that only low level features are domain
dependent, while deeper features/layers of AEs are domain
independent mostly preserving structural information of the
face. Full fine-tuning of the AEs will try to learn this struc-
tural information from a training set of WMCA database,
which has a significantly smaller number of bona-fide train-
ing samples, than CelebA DB, leading to over-fitting of the
system. The effectiveness of the proposed RGB-to-MC do-
main adaptation, via partial fine-tuning, is proved experi-
mentally. Third, we demonstrate, that learning the features
of individual facial regions, is more discriminative than the
features learned from an entire face.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the first
attempts applying deep-learning technologies, and domain
adaptation, to the task of multi-channel face PAD, giving
promising results and motivating to enhance the research in
this direction.
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